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This paper examines banking and financial sector return co-movements between the three 
largest Central and Eastern European countries to have recently joined the European Union, 
namely the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. In order to build up an understanding of the 
soundness and stability of the banking systems of these new member states, we try to determine 
whether it is contagion, or interdependence that is driving the co-movements between these 
markets. Employing various different tests of propagation and controlling for own-country news 
and other fundamentals, we find evidence of cross-border banking sector contagion and 
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The trend towards market integration, both internationally as well as in the newly 
enlarged European Union (EU), has highlighted the reality that international markets have 
progressively more influence on each other and are moving ever more closely together. Such co-
movement according to Forbes and Rigobon (1999) can be attributed either to contagion, or 
merely to strong real linkages between the economies, something they define as interdependence.  
Banking crisis is hardly a new phenomenon. In fact, the development of the international 
banking sector has consistently been marred by crises, generating a diverse array of mechanisms 
to reduce their strength and impact.  In more recent times, the incidence of banking and financial 
sector crises has intensified and their effect on the domestic and international economy has 
become even more profound
1. Understanding both the nature and the causes of dramatic co-
movements, between the banking sectors of differing economies with a view to gaining insight 
into market linkages, has consequently become a major research topic in international finance.  
With the recent enlargement of the European Union (EU), the importance of extending 
banking and financial sector understanding to include the new member states becomes 
imperative. As they move towards monetary union, their role in maintaining the strength of the 
euro area banking system is amplified. This paper therefore serves to examine whether contagion 
can be identified as a source of co-movement between the banking sectors of the three largest 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) to have recently joined the EU namely the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The concept of contagion has been largely disputed in the 
literature and as pointed out in Section II, defined in various different ways. In this paper, we 
consider contagion as the significant increase in cross-country linkages after a shock to one 
country (or group of countries). We aim to study the nature and existence of these co-movements, 
and as a second step move towards understanding their pass-through. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II outlines the importance of 
contagion and reviews the traditional methods for identification. Section III briefly describes the 
evolution of the banking systems of the CEECs. Section IV outlines the data we adopt for our 
study. Section IV tests for the existence of contagion between the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland and presents the results found. In Section VI we attempt to estimate the different channels 
through which shocks are propagated. Finally, Section VII concludes. 
 
                                                 
1 e.g. The Mexican crisis (1994), Asian and Russian (1997-1998) crises. 
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Contagion has been defined in many different ways in the literature, including the 
transfer of any shock across countries (Edwards 2000). Eichengreen and Rose (1999) and 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) define contagion as the situation where the knowledge of crisis in 
one country increases the risk of crisis in another country. Edwards (2000) goes on to restrict the 
term economic contagion to those situations where the magnitude with which a shock is 
transmitted exceeds what was expected on the ex ante basis of ‘fundamentals’. Despite the 
inability of authors to agree on an exact definition of contagion, evaluating whether it occurs 
across countries or regions is important for several reasons.   
A critical assumption of investment strategy is that most economic disturbances are 
country specific. Markets in different countries should therefore display relatively low 
correlations, and consequently a role for international diversification should be expected. If 
however, either positive or negative contagion does occur after a shock to the system, then market 
performance would either increase or decrease depending on the nature of the contagion, 
undermining the rationale for international diversification. Positive contagion in this sense refers 
to an increase in the correlation coefficient during a crisis period when compared to the tranquil 
time. In the case of negative contagion, the opposite is true; the correlation coefficient of the 
crisis period is significantly lower than the coefficient during the pre or post crisis phase. While 
more recent literature distinguishing between positive and negative contagion explicitly allows 
for the case that other markets might benefit from a crisis in one country (Bayoumi et al. 2003 
and Linne 1999), many international institutions and policy makers remain concerned that a 
negative shock to one country can have a negative impact on financial flows to another country.  
Such an impact can arise irrespective as to whether or not the fundamentals of the second 
economy are strong and whether there are any real sector linkages between the two countries. 
While the effect may only be temporary, it could lead to a financial crisis in the second country, a 
crisis completely unwarranted by the country’s fundamentals and policies. For all of these 
reasons, it is important to determine if, and under what circumstances, contagion occurs.  
Much of the theoretical work on the international propagation of shocks can be broadly 
categorized into three different categories: aggregate shocks which affect the economic 
fundamentals of more than one country, country-specific shocks which affect the economic 
fundamentals of other countries, and shocks which are not explained by fundamentals and are 
categorized as pure contagion. Empirical research in this field largely focuses on testing for the 
  3existence of contagion and subsequently estimating the different channels through which shocks 
are propagated throughout the international financial system. 
The most widely used procedures for testing for contagion are based on simple OLS 
regressions (Andersen & Bollerslev, 1998 and Andersen et al, 2003), Principal Component 
analysis (Kaminsky & Reinhart, 2000) and Correlation Coefficient analysis (Bennett & Kelleher, 
1988; King & Wadhawani, 1990; Calvo & Reihart, 1996; Edwards, 1998; and Baig & Goldfajn, 
1999). Tests using correlation analysis assume that changes in the underlying coefficients imply a 
shift in cross-country/market correlations. This technique has been widely adopted in the 
literature due to its simplicity; it does however fail to recognize a bias that is brought about by the 
unadjusted coefficient being conditional on market movements over the time period under 
consideration (Forbes & Rigobon, 1999). Forbes and Rigobon highlight the importance of 
distinguishing between contagion and interdependence whereby the former relates to cross-
market linkages being fundamentally different after a shock to one market, while the later implies 
no significant changes in relationships despite shocks hitting the recipient market. Favero and 
Giavazzi introduce a further test of contagion, testing for non-linearities in the propagation 
mechanism of country-specific shocks. Through the use of the term ‘non-linearities’ they stress 
that contagion refers to a significant reinforcement of linkages during crisis periods, thereby 
additionally classifying significant reductions in these relationships as contagion. Much of the 
work to date fails to distinguish between the two, the notable exception being Tai (2004a, 2004b) 
who tests whether contagion can occur at the industry level, in particular in the banking industry 
during the Asian crisis.  
The second part of this literature focuses on estimating the different channels through 
which shocks are propagated across countries.  From an empirical point of view, only very few 
varying techniques have been employed, namely Logit-Probit models (Eichengreen, Rose & 
Wyplosz, 1997; and Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999), OLS regressions (Baig & Goldfajn, 1999, 
2000; De Gregario & Valdes, 2001; Favero & Giavazzi, 2000; Gelos & Sahay, 2000; Glick & 
Rose, 1998; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2000) and Principal Component Analysis. Very few 
papers have attempted to use news as the identifying condition for the propagation of shocks.  
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1997) studied the collapse of fixed exchange rates in the ERM 
at the end of 1993, with one country’s collapse taken as the exogenous event.  They subsequently 
calculate the probability of a country’s crisis affecting the probability of other countries facing a 
similar crisis. Baig and Goldfajn (1999) studied the impact of daily news in one country’s stock 
market (exogenous event) on other countries’ markets during the East Asian crisis. They find that 
a substantial proportion of a country’s news impacts neighboring economies.  
  4Section II  Central and Eastern European Banking Systems 
 
Having endured over a decade of substantial reform and stabilization, financial sector 
development in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland finds itself in the final stages. The 
privatization of the large banks has ultimately been completed, and foreign strategic owners, most 
of them EU-based banks, dominate the banking sector. After an enormous clean up of portfolios, 
the standardization of banking sector regulations along with the new ownership structures, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are finally facing the same issues challenging most 
industrialized nations.  
Much of the 1990s however was a period of stagnation with all countries experiencing a 
decade of transition. The Czech Republic, in particular, emerging as a single economy after the 
fall of the communist regime in the early 1990s, was faced with massive economic restructuring. 
The early phase of transition for all three countries was generally characterized by banking crisis 
and recapitalization programs as well as by a considerable change in structural ownership.   
Having inherited underdeveloped, undercapitalized and badly managed banks from the past, these 
economies further faced serious exogenous and institutional shocks, keeping the levels of 
financial intermediation at very low levels. Such shocks included high and persistent inflation, 
banking sector distress coupled with financial and currency crisis taking place both at home and 
abroad.    
Considering the recapitalization programs undertaken, Table I shows that the Czech 
Republic had concluded a large set of measures by 1997, however, substantial additional funds 
had to be put up to prepare the countries largest banks for privatization. Poland was the most 
successful in its reform, with cumulated costs below 1.5% of GDP in 2000. Both Hungary and 
Poland managed to stabilize their banking systems by 1997 with the help of recapitalization 
programs, the Czech Republic however continued to face problems up until the new millennium. 
A rough estimate of these costs is shown in Table I, where we report the fiscal cost of the bank 
recapitalization programs.
2 (Capiro and Klingebiel, 1999; and Barth et. al., 2000).The evolution 
of the banking sector indices for the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, can be seen in Table 
II and Table III as well as in Figure I, Figure II and Figure III respectively. 
In our analysis, we define the period between 1994 and end 1999 as a period of economic 
stagnation or reform. 
 
                                                 
2 Costs include the cost of recapitalization and losses incurred through protecting deposits either implicitly or explicitly 
through government deposit insurance schemes.  Sometimes costs of corporate restructuring are also included. For this 
reason, fiscal costs are not always directly comparable. 
  5Section III  Data 
 
Modern finance theory generally assumes that banks are considered as institutions that 
help to solve market failures, while playing a compensating role for the limitations of financial 
markets (Allan and Gale, 2001; Mishkin, 2001). The banking and financial sectors of these 
economies are thus a natural focal point when considering market co-movements between these 
countries. 
For our empirical analysis, we make use of nine and a half years of daily data (July 1994 
to end 2004). We adopt the DataStream banking and financial sector indices3 for the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland, as well as for the United Kingdom (UK), United States (US) and 
EU. Adopting DataStream indices provides a comparative index for each country, which captures 
more than 75% of the total market. The DataStream indices are value weighted indices based on 
key publicly-quoted banks in the each country. The weighting is based on the market 
capitalization of each bank. The larger the market cap, the greater the weighting, giving an 
accurate reflection of the banking sector.   
These indices were obtained in US dollar terms, their per cent changes and natural logs 
were subsequently calculated. The US series employed was lagged by one day in order to account 
for time differences. 
 
III.I  Creation of Dummy Variables 
As no high frequency variables (e.g. daily data) that can approximate the fundamentals in 
each country exist for our estimations in Section V, we employ an approach whereby we create a 
set of dummy variables constructed from macro-economic news announcements. Such dummy 
series were created via the collection of daily news releases either from the central bank or 
national statistical office for the UK, EU
4 and US, or where official figures were unavailable we 
employed the LexisNexis news databank.
5 The searches were conducted focusing both on central 
bank and national statistical office releases as well as on the individual variables we wished to 
include. The variables of interest were: unemployment, short-term interest rates, consumer price 
index, terms of trade (or an indicator of market openness when not available), real gross domestic 
product (GDP), current account deficit. These indicators are largely considered to be of most 
                                                 
3 Analysis was conducted on both the bank and financial sector indices for all countries, however due to the largely 
similar results obtained only the banking sector results are presented.  This similarity is hardly surprising considering 
that between 85-88% of total assets of the financial system are held by banks for all three countries under analysis. 
4 The EU variable was created by combining data for Germany before 1999 with EU data after 1999. 
5 Our sources were limited due to lack of alternatives on LexisNexis, we made use of MTI Econews for Hungary, CTK 
for the Czech Republic and the Polish News Bulletin for announcements in Poland. 
  6importance in the assessment of macro-economic influence on the banking system stability in the 
literature (Huchinson, 1999; Demirgűç-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998; Timmermans, 2001). For 
Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, we also included various other announcements; such as 
a change in exchange rate regime, a change in the country’s credit rating by a major rating 
agency, namely Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s or Fitch, or the decision by the central bank to 
intervene in the foreign exchange market.  
Following Baig and Goldfjn (1999), we distinguished between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news by 
using simple guidelines - any credible attempt to restructure or improve the economic situation 
was deemed as ‘good’, whereas news that indicated a further decline of the real or financial sector 
was deemed ‘bad’. The good (bad) news dummy series was assigned a ‘1’ on the release of 
favorable (unfavorable) macro-economic news.  
A fall in inflation, better GDP growth, and an improvement in the terms of trade were all 
assigned a ‘good’ news dummy, as were a fall in the consumer price index, lower unemployment 
figures, and a reduction in the current account deficit. Finally, we assumed that the central banks 
followed a price stability or inflation targeting strategy and assigned a ‘good’ news dummy to a 
decrease in the short-term interest rate, as set by the central bank. For the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland, we further considered any news of the country’s move towards EU 
membership as ‘good’, together with an increase in the country’s credit rating by one of the major 
ratings agencies. Furthermore, we considered any move in exchange rate regimes towards a free-
float as being positive and any rescue packages or funding given to the country by international 
organizations as favorable.  
While the privatization of state-owned banks can in principle have benefits as well as 
costs, the overall general considerations of the incentive effects of private ownership, as well as 
empirical evidence on this issue support the view that the benefits outweigh the costs (EBRD, 
1997). Private ownership generally provides better incentives for more disciplined risk taking of 
managers along with the limitation of government intervention into the allocation of credit. 
Furthermore, it enhances the incentives for more effective monitoring and screening of banking 
institutions, ultimately improving the general stability and soundness of the banking system in 
which they operate. For this reason, we further considered any increase or speeding up of the 
privatization process as being positive. 
For ‘bad’ news the opposite was true. We assigned a ‘bad’ news dummy variable when 
the rate of inflation increased, GDP growth declined or the terms of trade index worsened. 
Furthermore, a rise in consumer prices, an increase in unemployment or a fall in the interest rate 
was considered bad for the economy. Although very general, we assumed that a rise in interest 
  7rates would signal non inflationary pressures and concerns of deflation resulting in notably below 
trend GDP growth and consequently a worsening economic situation. Again, for the Czech 
Republic, any delay in EU membership was considered ‘bad’, as was a fall in the country’s credit 
rating. We further considered a delay in the privatization process for banks operating in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary or Poland, as negative. 
  Once all the good and bad news series were created for each variable separately, we 
aggregated the series to obtain a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ news dummy series for each country. These 
aggregated series were employed for our regression analysis in Section VI. 
  8Section IV  Testing for Contagion: Methodology and Empirical Results 
 
IV.I  Banking Sector Correlations 
In order to obtain evidence on the extent of banking sector co-movements in these 
countries, we begin by estimating the unadjusted correlation coefficients of the daily changes in 
the banking sector indices of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. The sample period begins 
on the 19th of July 1994
6 and spans till the end of December 2004. We estimate the correlations 
in the overall sample period, and subsequently apply the Likelihood ratio test for the significance 
of group-wise correlations following Baig and Goldfajn (1999), Valdés (1995), as well as 
Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990) testing the null hypothesis of no group-wise correlation.
7  The 
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Where   and  x σ y σ  represent the variances of the daily changes in banking sector and total 
market indices of two distinct countries. 
The results for the total sample banking sector cross-country correlations are presented in 
Table IV. All pairs demonstrate positive coefficients ranging between 0.19 for Poland and the 
Czech Republic, and 0.27 for both Hungary and Poland and Hungary and the Czech Republic. It 
is interesting to note that the full sample correlations between the Czech Republic and Poland are 
particularly affected by the sizeable turmoil that had an impact on the Czech Republic for much 
of the 1990s, while hardly any of this influence is evident in the relationship between the Czech 
Republic and Hungary.  
As contagion is often defined as a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a 
shock to an individual country or group of countries, we further split our data into a reform, or 
stabilization period and a tranquil period as defined in Section II.
8  Again we calculate the 
correlation coefficients. At a first glance, we see that the reform period correlations for all pairs 
are larger when compared to both the total sample and tranquil periods. It is interesting to note 
                                                 
6 The first date on which data was available for all three markets. 
7 The test statistic:  R N log − is distributed as  with 








⎛ p p degrees of freedom, where│R│is the 
determinant of the correlation matrix, N, the number of observations and p the number of series being tested. 
8 Stabilization period stems from 19
th July 1994 to end 1999, tranquil period: January 2000 to end 2004. 
  9that the correlation coefficient between the Czech Republic and Poland remains the lowest of the 
pairs at 0.29, while the coefficients for the Czech Republic and Hungary, and Hungary and 
Poland are very similar in magnitude, 0.33 and 0.31 respectively. During the tranquil period, the 
coefficient between the Czech Republic and Poland falls to 0.15, while the remaining coefficients 
continue to demonstrate rather strong correlations of 0.25 and 0.26 respectively. This finding is in 
line with our expectations. 
 
IV.II Rolling  Correlations 
The problem that exists with applying the full sample for correlation analysis is such that 
it smoothes out much of the shorter duration interactions between markets.  For instance, while it 
is evident from the fall in correlation that events in the Czech Republic during the reform period 
had a substantial impact on its neighboring Hungary and Poland, it is impossible to disentangle 
these movements as they become diminished via the use of the entire sample. To further 
investigate co-movements during the period of turmoil, we repeat the exercise for sub-samples 
consisting of three-month windows, rolling them till the end date. We calculate rolling 
correlations covering the entire sample, however, for brevity only the results for the period 
February 1997 to November 1999 are shown in Table V
9.  It is interesting to note that the 
correlations between the Czech Republic and Poland are highly volatile, fluctuating between 
positive and negative correlations. While also demonstrating a degree of volatility, the 
coefficients for the Czech Republic and Hungary are far more stable and steadily correlated. 
Hungary and Poland, on the other hand, have consistent high positive correlations throughout, 
and at times demonstrate cross-country coefficients as high as 0.51. Furthermore, it is remarkable 
how quickly and abruptly the correlations increase (to 0.50 for the Czech Republic and Hungary, 
0.38 for the Czech Republic and Poland) between August 1998 and February 1999, when for the 
first time the Czech Republic demonstrated signs of improvement.  
 
IV.III  Likelihood Ratio Test 
While the full sample and the rolling correlations help to determine the patterns of co-
movements between markets, they are not useful for gaining an understanding as to whether there 
is a significant difference in these market correlations during turbulent and tranquil times. We 
follow Forbes and Rigobon (1999) whereby we try to determine whether market movements can 
be attributed to contagion or to interdependence. To address this issue, we apply a two-sample, 
                                                 
9 Results for the other periods are available on request. Correlations during these periods are largely stable with very 
little degree of volatility evident for all pairs. 
  10heteroskedastic  t-test, and examine whether a significant increase in correlations in the 
stabilization period is evident. If the correlations increase significantly, then there are grounds for 
believing that these markets have moved away from relationships dictated by traditional 
movements of fundamentals. On the other hand, if the increases are not significant, then it is 
possible to assume that these markets are simply reacting to shocks that are common-cause or 
spill over generated. 
Applying the likelihood ratio test, we examine the null hypothesis that the tranquil period 
correlations are greater or equal to the correlation during reform against the alternative hypothesis 
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where Xt and  are the estimated sample mean and variance following the Fisher transformation. 
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  11The results for the heteroskedastic t-test are presented in Table VI. For all pairs, the 
reform period correlations are greater than the corresponding tranquil period coefficients within a 
1 per cent level of significance. Due to these fundamental differences in cross-country linkages, 
we can infer the existence of contagion for all pairs during the period under analysis. The Log 
likelihood ratio test statistics (LR) are presented at the top of each table respectively. The test 
aims to reject that all pair wise correlations are zero; we find evidence of this at the 1 per cent 
level of significance for all tests. 
 
IV.IV  Bias in the Correlation Coefficient 
While the simple test of contagion based on correlation analysis above appears to show 
evidence of contagion between both the banking sector indices of the CEEC economies, recent 
literature has highlighted a bias in the correlation coefficient central to this analysis. (Forbes & 
Rigobon, 1999). This bias proves to be especially large during periods of market turmoil which, 
in effect, is the focus of this test. 
The use of the unadjusted (or conditional) coefficient assumes the bilateral analysis of 
markets, x and y, and a division of the data sample into a high variance (h) and a low variance (l) 
group, representing stabilization and tranquil periods respectively. We start by estimating the 
correlation coefficient of the reform period according to the standard definition (1.) and adjusting 
to account for higher volatility of returns during periods of turmoil.  

































where  y ρ  is the stabilization period correlation between x and y,   and  are the variance 




























































Where  x ρ  is the correlation between x and y during the tranquil period,  y γ  is the corresponding 
correlation coefficient in the turbulent period as obtained above. 
  12  As discussed above however, it is possible that these increases in the correlation 
coefficient result from a bias due to market volatility during this time rather than purely from 
contagion. To assess whether this bias affects our tests of contagion we repeat the analysis, this 
time using the adjustment seen in (6.). We estimate the tests using the unconditional rather than 
the conditional coefficient and analyse each banking sector individually as the source of 
contagion. These results are presented in Table VIII.  
In adjusting for an increase in market volatility, we find a significant difference in the 
results obtained. When assigning either Hungary or Poland as the reforming country, we find that 
while these markets are highly correlated, this co-movement can be attributed to close linkages 
through economic fundamentals rather than to the existence of contagion. 
On the other hand, looking at the Czech Republic as the reforming country, we find that 
when controlling for an increase in volatility during turbulent times, our results are unaffected. In 
this case we are able to infer that during the period under analysis, the Czech Republic is 
identifiable as the primary source of banking sector contagion between these three markets. 
 
IV.V  Vector Autoregression Analysis 
The 1990s were marked by periods of chaos in the Eastern European countries when 
economic uncertainty together with a general lack of capital and skills in the banking sector 
ultimately resulted in a banking crisis. The Czech Republic in particular suffered from various 
banking failures/ defaults having a significant negative impact on its neighboring Hungary and 
Poland. 
In order to try to understand the patterns of banking sector pressure, we make use of the 
Vector Auto-regression (VAR) methodology as it recognizes the endogeneity of all the variables 
in the system. Furthermore, it allows us to incorporate lagged values of the variables and to move 
away from contemporaneous correlations. 
The VAR model takes the form of: 
t t t u By x L A = + ) (   (8.) 
with 
p
p s L A L A L A L A − − − − = ... 1 ) (
2
1  
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' = s t u u E  for  , s t ≠ , 0 ) , ( = t t u x E  
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and 
  13) (Const yt =  
In this standard VAR, x is a (1 x N) vector of variables, A is an (N x N) matrix of 
coefficients, u is an (N x 1) vector of white noise disturbance terms, and L represents the lag 
operator (for example, L
ixt = xt-1). The x vector contains the daily change in the bank indices for 
the US (USbank), UK (UKbank), EU (EUbank), Hungary (HUbank), Poland (PLbank) and the 
Czech Republic (CZbank). This equation consequently allows us to analyze the full range of 
interaction between the banking sector indices for all of the six countries.  
We run the six variable VAR for each of the countries under analysis and obtain the 
impulse response functions for the shock originating from the given country. We chose a lag 
length of two according to both the Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn information criterion, and repeat 
the exercise for each of the countries. Testing for autocorrelation of residuals we find that all 
autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations at all lags are nearly zero, and all Q-statistics are 
insignificant with large p-values. This finding is consistent with no serial correlation in the 
residuals.
10 The graphs for the banking sector total, reform and tranquil periods are shown in 
Figure IV-a, b, c; V-a, b, c and VI- a, b and c. Only the responses of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland are presented, and country responses to own shocks are omitted. Only 
shocks originating from the US appear to be significant for all three time frames, while the UK 
has a significant negative impact on Poland in the tranquil period. All shocks seem to be absorbed 
within four to five days. 
In all cases, we see a shock from the US resulting in an immediate increase in the 
respective bank index, followed around three days later by a sharp fall. The effect of a shock 
originating in the UK in the tranquil period, results in an immediate fall in the Polish index, 
followed by a slight recovery in day three. In all cases the shock has died by the sixth day. 
In Table IX we present the proportion of the idiosyncratic variance of each country 
explained by a shock from the US banking sector. We show the percentages of movement in each 
sectoral index explained by a shock from the US. It is interesting to note how these effects vary 
between the turbulent and calmer periods.  
                                                 
10 These results are not presented here, but are available from the authors on request. 
  14Section VI  Determining the Nature of Propagation 
 
VI. I  The Impact of Macro-economic News Announcements 
 
Domestic News 
Following Baig and Goldfajn (1999), Ganapolsky and Schmukler (1998) and Kaminsky 
and Schmukler (1998) who estimate the impact of various news announcements on the 
movements of various markets, we expand our analysis further to attempt to discover whether the 
banking sectors of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are receptive to macro-economic 
news released both domestically and internationally. In a first step, we run a simple regression 
including domestic good and bad news dummies for each of the three banking indices, with the 
objective of discovering the impact that good and bad news releases have on the indices during 
the total sample, stabilization and tranquil periods. 
The regression takes the following form, and is run with robust coefficients controlling for 
heteroskedasticity:  
∑ + + + = − t t i t i Dummies R R ε β β α 1 ,   ( 9.) 
 
Where     ,  ;  and    1 = i 3 T t ,.... 1 = {}
2 , 10 t i N ϑ ε ≈
 
  As the variables all demonstrate autocorrelation of order 1 the regressions were 
consequently run including two lags of the dependent variable. Including the lagged variables in 
the regressions however, proved to over-ride the effects coming from the news dummies. As a 
second step, we ran the regressions with the dependent variable set equal to the residual of 
equation (9.). The regression this time took the form: 
∑ + + = e Dummies t β γ ε   (10.) 
Where     ,  ;  and    1 = i 3 T t ,.... 1 = {}
2 , 10 t i N ϑ ε ≈
 
The results were largely similar to those obtained under equation (9.) and hence only 
results excluding lagged variables are reported. Regressions including lagged variables of the 
dependent variable are available on request. A summary of the results for the domestic dummy 
regressions are presented in Table X, while the full results can be seen in Tables XI-Panel a, XI-
Panel b, and XI-Panel c for total reform period, and tranquil period sub samples respectively.  
  15In analyzing the total sample period (Table XI-Panel a), we see that unfavorable domestic 
announcements had a significant downward effect on the banking sector of the Czech Republic. 
The index of Hungary, on the other hand, rises on the release of unfavorable news, possibly 
resulting from the desire of investors to move away from the troubled Czech Republic into ‘safer’ 
alternatives in its neighboring Hungary. No significant results are apparent for Poland.  
The associated residuals from these regressions act as a further measure of contagion, this 
time controlling for fundamentals. Comparing the correlations of these residuals to those 
presented in Table IV, we see a substantial increase. The LR test demonstrates statistically 
significant group-wise correlations allowing us to conclude that contagion persists well above and 
beyond the identified fundamentals over the entire sample period.  
Looking at the reform period (Table XI-Panel b), we see that unfavorable domestic news 
in the Czech Republic resulted in a significant fall in the country’s banking index. No significant 
results were found for either Hungary or Poland.  
Controlling for fundamentals, we see a substantial increase in the coefficients between 
Poland and Hungary, while those for Poland and the Czech Republic remain unchanged. Even 
though the residual correlations between Hungary and the Czech Republic demonstrate a negative 
relationship, the LR test statistic is still significant, revealing statistically significant group-wise 
correlations between the banking sector indices of these countries, thus providing further 
evidence of contagion during this period. 
Finally, for the tranquil period (Table XI-Panel c), unfavorable domestic news in the 
Czech Republic continues to demonstrate a significantly adverse impact on the domestic banking 
sector, with the index falling on a negative announcement. We see Hungary’s index rising on the 
receipt of good news and falling significantly on bad news. Surprisingly, the banking sector of 
Poland falls significantly on the announcement of both good and bad domestic news. A possible 
reason for this could be the jittery sentiment clouding the countries of Eastern Europe so soon 
after the turmoil that troubled the Czech Republic for much of the previous decade which could 
be picked by via the use of sub-period analysis.  
The residual correlation matrix shows a substantial increase in all pair-wise coefficients 
when compared to those in Table IV. Statistically significant group-wise correlations are revealed 
via the LR test, implying the persistence of contagion effects between the analyzed markets. We 
can therefore conclude that during stabilization and tranquil periods as well as over the total 
period, contagion persists between these markets above and beyond the identified fundamentals. 
 
 
  16International News 
To extend the analysis further, we ran the regressions again, this time including the 
complete set of news dummies on the right hand side. These regressions serve to aid the 
understanding of the impact of cross-border news on respective banking sectors. The results are 
presented in Table XII-Panel a, b and c.  
Looking first at regional effects, we see that over the entire sample period, bad news from 
the Czech Republic has a significant downward effect on the markets of Hungary, Poland and the 
Czech Republic. Surprisingly, bad news originating in Hungary significantly increases the indices 
of all three countries. Adverse macro news announcements in Poland have a significantly 
negative impact on the Czech market. This movement is however, not unexpected when we 
consider the high degree of correlation between these markets as demonstrated in Table IV.  
Internationally, both good and bad news originating in the EU has a significant negative 
influence on all three markets, with the good news dummy slightly more significant than the bad 
news dummy. Such an effect quite possibly demonstrates that an improvement in the general 
economic conditions in the EU results in a movement of investors towards the new market. 
Finally, adverse news announcements stemming from the UK positively affect the indices of both 
the Czech Republic and Hungary. While these findings are puzzling, it is possible due to the large 
degree of foreign ownership in both the Czech Republic and Hungary, investors might chose to 
move away from the UK on release of bad news and concentrate on investments within these 
countries instead. Alternatively, foreign investors might wish to have European exposure, and on 
the release of bad news in the UK, they may move to Hungary and the Czech Republic as 
substitutes. There are no significant results for news released from the US. 
Taking a closer look at the unexpected effects of unfavorable news coming from both 
Hungary and the UK, we analyze the individual components of bad news in order to pin point the 
reason for this movement. These findings are presented in Table XIII, panel a. We see that an 
increase in unemployment in the UK causes a significant increase in the banking sector indices of 
the Czech Republic, and Hungary, while a rise in inflation appears to further cause an increase in 
the index of Hungary. Moving to the bad news originating in Hungary, again we see that a rise in 
inflation causes an increase in the indices of Poland and Hungary as does an interest rate hike in 
Hungary. The Hungarian market index appears to be reacting to Polish unemployment figures, 
while we find no significant results for the movement caused by good news from Poland. We 
further implement the CUSM test of stability which is based on the cumulative sum of the 
recursive residuals; we find that all parameters demonstrate stability.
11
                                                 
11 These results are not presented here for brevity, but are available from the authors on request. 
  17Assessing the reform period, we observe that all countries reacted negatively to bad news 
originating in the Czech Republic. Bad news originating in Hungary has a further significant 
positive impact on the index of all countries. Negative news released from Poland results in a 
significant fall of the Czech index. 
Both good and bad news from the UK impacts the Czech banking sector negatively. This 
is hardly surprising considering the generally negative economic situation in the Czech Republic 
during the time of analysis, encouraging investors to move out and into more stable 
environments. Furthermore, good news coming from the UK has a positive effect on the index of 
Hungary. Considering the banking crisis that the country experienced during this time it is not 
surprising that we see the bank index in the Czech Republic typically falling to all news 
announcements. No significant impact from news released in the US is evident. 
During the tranquil period, adverse macro news coming from the Czech Republic has a 
significant downward impact on all three markets. It is interesting to note that bad news 
originating in the Czech Republic is again significant in all three markets; however, it affects 
Hungary and Poland in the opposite direction than during the reform period. This impact is hardly 
unusual considering the combination of the high degree of correlation between the markets, 
coupled with the instability that affected the country for most of the 1990s. All Polish news, both 
good and bad has a negative impact on the banking sectors of all three markets while the 
movement resulting from adverse news is slightly more significant. Taking a closer look at these 
results, we see that the Hungarian index falls on news of reduced inflation, while Poland reacts to 
current account news. There are no significant results for the Czech Republic. These results are 
presented in Table XIII, panel b. Favorable news from Hungary negatively affects all three 
banking markets. Looking closer at these results, we see that the Czech Republic reacts 
negatively to an increase in Hungarian unemployment figures while the Polish index falls on 
news relating to the current account. The Hungarian index, on the other hand, is reacting most 
significantly to both interest rate news as well as a fall in unemployment figures and slightly less 
significantly to current account data releases. Again we implement the CUSUM test and find 
stability in all parameters. Bad news stemming from Hungary results in an increase in the banking 
indices in all markets. Looking closely at these results, we find that both the Czech Republic and 
Poland react positively to poor GDP figures, while the Hungarian banking sector rises as 
unemployment figures fall. We see an increase in the significance of both good and bad news 
coming from the EU during this time, when compared to the tranquil period. As the tranquil 
period coincides with the creation of the EU, such an increase in significance could perhaps 
demonstrate the new investment opportunities that have opened up to markets in Central and 
  18Eastern Europe. Good news coming from the newly created monetary union has a significant 
negative impact on the banking sectors of all countries. Again all parameters appear to be stable. 
Bad news from the EU has a significantly negative impact on the bank index of both 
Hungary. With the overall economic situation in the EU improving, companies and businesses are 
in a better situation to make more money. As a result, investors’ expectations are such that share 
prices and dividends will go up more in manufacturing and service industry shares than in more 
conservative banking shares, thus the fall in the banking price indices of the analyzed countries. It 
is clear from the analysis, that during the tranquil period, the Czech Republic is still very nervous; 
any bad news has a highly significant influence on its banking sector index.  News released in 
both the UK and the US has no significant impact on the indices of the Czech Republic, Hungary 
or Poland during this time. 
 
V.II  Modeling the Volatility of Shocks  
A further test of contagion is based on modeling increases in volatility during turbulent 
periods in one country’s index by extreme movements in the other country’s index. Following 
Favero and Giavazzi (2002), the process begins by considering a bivariate version (N=2) of the 
turbulent period. This reduced form model is simply a VAR specification which takes the familiar 
form as presented in Section IV.V. According to both the Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion the optimal lag length for our model is two. 
In order to identify country-specific shocks, we calculate the residuals   and   of the 
estimated VAR which are heteroskedastic and contain information on episodes of market 
turbulence. A dummy variable is subsequently assigned to the residuals which lie above a certain 
threshold, in this case equal to three times the residual standard deviation of the VAR, capturing 
regional and country specific events. The choice of three standard deviations as a threshold is 
motivated by previous research. Gindraux (2000) provides a detailed sensitivity analysis for 
threshold values and finds that typically dummies selected with a threshold of three survive the 
testing-down procedure to over-identify the structural system of equations in the second step of 
the methodology.  
t i u , t j u ,
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  19Residuals larger than the assigned threshold are considered as country-specific or local 
shocks. Dummy variables are created at the local (country-specific), regional (i.e. CZ,HU,PL or 
US,UK,EU) and global level (across all markets), and represent points in time when a 
combination of markets simultaneously experience extreme movements allowing for the 
eradication of hetroskedasticity and non-normality. 
The stabilization period equations as defined by: 
t i i t i t i u w y , , δ λ + =   (12.) 
t j t j j t j t j u u w y , , , γ δ λ + + =   (13.) 
are subsequently re-written and replaced with the dummy variables created in (11.)  
t i i t i t i u w y , , δ λ + =   (14.) 
t j j t i i t j j t j t j d d u w y , , , , γ γ δ λ + + + =   (15.) 
 
where the test of contagion is given by γ = 0, in essence testing that the subset of parameters in 
corresponding to the subset of  that are exceedences but not co-exceedences are equal to 0.  i y t i d ,
The results obtained from the F-G test are presented in Table XV. After running the 
reduced form VAR as described above, we identified 260 local shocks broken down as follows: 
 
CZ HU PL EU UK US 
48 26 61 43 39 43 
 
It is interesting that Poland suffers the largest number of local shocks, while figures for 
the Czech Republic are almost double those seen in Hungary. On a more aggregated level, we 
were unable to identify any global shocks, or periods where turbulence existed simultaneously 
across the six countries. However, breaking the data into regional sections, we identified four 
events of extreme movements: 
 
EASTERN EUROPE (CZ, HU, PL)  INTERNATIONAL (EU, UK, US) 
2 2 
 
Both shocks that occurred throughout Eastern Europe were negative in all three countries 
while one set of shocks at the international level proved positive and the other negative. A 
breakdown of the dates and types of shocks along with news announcements made on these days 
are presented in Table XIV. 
  20Inputting these shocks as dummies into the model, we test for contagion, the results of 
which are presented in Table XV. Again, we find evidence of contagion between the banking 
sectors albeit to a differing extent and from varying origins. We find that local shocks originating 
in Poland, the EU and the US have a significant negative impact on the banking index of 
Hungary, while the international shock positively affects the Czech Republic. 
  
  21Section VI  Conclusion 
 
Considerable co-movement appears to be present in the banking sectors of Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech Republic, indicating that the largest markets in Central and Eastern Europe 
have tended to move together, and have had substantial influence on one another.  
Comparing unadjusted (conditional) correlations between the tranquil and turbulent 
periods, we see evidence in favour of substantial contagion during this time. Contagion in this 
sense was defined as a significant increase in the stabilization periods’ correlation coefficients 
when compared to a more tranquil period. However, adjusting for an increase in market volatility 
during the reform period, we find that contagion is only evident when the Czech Republic is 
identified as the ‘reforming’ country. For other countries, interdependence was identified as the 
cause of co-movements. Finally estimating a VAR equation to determine the influence that 
domestic, regional and international banking system shocks have on these markets, we find that 
the US banking system has the largest consistent effect on the CEE markets, with these shocks 
generally absorbed within four to five days.  
In attempting to identify the channel through which these shocks are propagated, we 
employ dummy variables to capture news announcements in various economies, and show that 
after controlling for own country news and other fundamentals, the cross-country correlations 
remain large and significant, and that consequently contagion between these markets exists. We 
show that macro-economic shocks originating in neighbouring countries had the largest 
significant impact on these markets, with the EU becoming increasingly more important with 
time. Shocks originating in the US were not significant during any period for any of the three 
economies. Finally we model increases in volatility during the reform period in one country’s 
banking sector by movement in another country’s index. We again find evidence of contagion. 
Throughout our analysis, it is unclear whether the increase in importance of the EU 
markets can be attributed to integration, or merely due to the coincidence that the economic union 
was created at this time and has since become a major influence for these countries. As data 
becomes available, further research into this may be useful. 
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Table I: Fiscal Costs of Bank Recapitalization  









Main part of the recapitalization program completed  
in fiscal costs up to the year indicated in % of GDP of that year 
8.9% 7.2%  1.6% 
Fiscal costs of the recapitalization program up to  
The year 2000 in % of GDP in 2000 
11.8% 6.8%  1.4% 
 
 
Table II: Evolution of Eastern European Banking Sectors 
Source: National Central Banks 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Market value of banking index (US$) 
Czech Republic    1515  1138  1824 927  470 1433 
Hungary   23  202  532  1058  1362  1627 
Poland    998  1354 2849 3517 6152 8472 
Foreign ownership (% of net assets) 
Czech  Republic    23 24 30 39 48 55 
Hungary    79 83 93 89 91 91 
Poland  3  4  14 15 17 47 70 
 
 
 Table III: Banking Sector Of The Czech Republic, Poland And Hungary  
Source: National Central Banks 
   CZECH REPUBLIC  HUNGARY  POLAND 
  1991 1994 1997 2000 1991 1994 1997 2000 1993  1994  1997  2000
# Active banks  24  52  53  40  36  43  44  39  104  82  83  74 
% Total domestic 
controlled 
83 65 57 35    84 37 31  55  51  47  27 
% Total foreign 
controlled 
17 35 43 65    16 63 69  45  49  53  73 
 
 
  26Table IV: Correlations of the CEECs Banking Index Returns 
Total sample: LR Test 202.65 *** 
   CZ HU PL 
CZ  1  0.27 0.19 
HU  0.27  1  0.27 
PL  0.19 0.27  1 
Reform  period (1994-end 1999): LR Test 87.52*** 
   CZ HU PL 
CZ  1  0.33 0.29 
HU  0.33  1  0.31 
PL  0.29 0.31  1 
Tranquil period (2000- end 2004): LR Test 148.84*** 
   CZ HU PL 
CZ  1  0.25 0.15 
HU  0.25  1  0.26 
PL  0.15 0.26  1 
Note: *, ** and *** denote rejection at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
LR Test attempts to reject the null hypothesis that all pair wise correlations are 0. 
Each pair wise correlation is tested for the null that the correlation is 0. 
  27 Table V: Banking Sector Index Rolling Correlations 
03/02/1997 to 30/04/1997: LR Test 4.93***  03/08/1998 to 30/10/1998: LR Test 16.73*** 
   CZ HU PL     CZ  HU  PL 
CZ  1  0.30 0.22  CZ  1  0.50 0.38 
HU  0.30  1  0.25  HU  0.50  1  0.49 
PL  0.22 0.25  1  PL  0.38 0.49  1 
01/05/1997 to 31/07/1997: LR Test 0.70***  02/11/1998 to 29/01/1999: LR Test 14.64*** 
   CZ HU PL     CZ  HU  PL 
CZ  1  0.15 -0.01  CZ  1  0.43 0.31 
HU  0.15  1  0.02  HU  0.43  1  0.51 
PL  -0.01 0.02  1  PL  0.31 0.51  1 
01/08/1997 to 31/10/1997: LR Test 8.52***  01/02/1999 to 30/04/1999: LR Test 6.77*** 
   CZ HU PL     CZ  HU  PL 
CZ  1  -0.12 0.03  CZ  1  0.24 0.10 
HU  -0.12  1  0.49  HU  0.24  1  0.40 
PL  0.03 0.49  1  PL  0.10 0.40  1 
03/11/1997 to 30/01/1998: LR Test 11.58***  03/05/1999 to30/07/1999: LR Test 1.18*** 
   CZ HU PL     CZ  HU  PL 
CZ  1 0.32  0.22  CZ  1  0.12 -0.05 
HU  0.32 1 0.51  HU  0.12  1  0.15 
PL  0.22 0.51  1  PL  -0.05 0.15  1 
02/02/1998 to 30/04/1998: LR Test 1.72***  02/08/1999 to 29/10/1999: LR Test 6.43*** 
   CZ HU PL     CZ  HU  PL 
CZ  1  0.18 -0.07  CZ  1  0.20 0.04 
HU  0.18  1  0.14  HU  0.20  1  0.41 
PL  -0.07 0.14  1  PL  0.04 0.41  1 
01/05/1998 to 31/07/1998: LR Test 6.28*** 
   CZ HU PL 
CZ  1  0.17 0.29 
HU  0.17  1  0.34 
PL  0.29 0.34  1 
 
Note: *, ** and *** denote rejection at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
LR Test attempts to reject the null hypothesis that all pair wise correlations are 0. 


















  28Table VI: Heteroskedastic t-Test: Banking Sector 
Reform periods (1994-end 1999): LR Test 90.58*** 
   CZ HU PL 
CZ  1  0.33*** 0.29*** 
HU  0.33***  1  0.31* 
PL  0.29*** 0.31***  1 
Tranquil period (2000- end 2004): LR Test 151.04*** 
   CZ HU PL 
CZ  1  0.25*** 0.15*** 
HU  0.25***  1  0.26* 
PL  0.31*** 0.26***  1 
Note: *, ** and *** denote rejection at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
LR Test attempts to reject the null hypothesis that all pair wise correlations are 0. 
Each pair wise correlation is tested for the null that the correlation is 0. 
The Heteroskedastic t-test attempts to reject the null of equal correlations. 
 
 







Test stat  Contagion? 
CZ-HU 0.33  0.25  0.27  5.73***  Yes 
CZ-PL 0.29  0.15  0.19  3.79***  Yes 
PL-HU 0.31  0.26  0.27  1.51**  Yes 
Note: *, ** and *** denote rejection at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 





Test stat  Contagion? 
CZ  HU 0.19  3.81***  Yes 
CZ  PL 0.17  3.32***  Yes 
HU  CZ 0.21  1.13 NO 
HU  PL 0.26  1.41 NO 
PL  CZ 0.25  1.12 NO 
PL  HU 0.27 1.22 NO 




  29   Table IX: Variance Decomposition 
days  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
The Czech Republic 
Total period  0.0 0.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Reform period  0.1 1.0 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Tranquil period  0.0 0.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Hungary 
Total period  0.0 0.8 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 
Reform period  0.0 1.9 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 
Tranquil period  0.0 0.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Poland 
Total period  0.0 1.1 6.2 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 
Reform period  0.0  0.8  10.3 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 
Tranquil period  0.0 1.5 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 
 
 
Table X: Summary of Own Country Dummies 
   Good News  Bad News 
Total period 
CZ   -  *** 
HU   +  *** 
PL    
Reform period  
CZ   -  **   
HU      
PL      
Tranquil period 
CZ   -  *** 
HU  - ***  + ** 
PL  - **  - *** 
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively. 



















  30Table XI: Regression Results With Own Country Dummies 
Panel a: Total period (1994- end 2004) 


























2 0.005 0.004 0.001 
Number of Obs.  2729  2729  2729 
Residual Correlation Matrix: LR Test 3673.00*** 
   CZ HU PL 
CZ  1  0.81 0.83 
HU  0.81  1  0.92 
PL  0.83 0.92  1 
Panel b: Reform period (1994- end 1999) 

























Adjusted R2  0.005  0.001  0.001 
Number of Obs.  1424  1424  1424 
Residual Correlation Matrix: LR Test 108.84*** 
   CZ HU PL 
CZ  1  -0.65 0.17 
HU  -0.65  1  0.51 
PL  0.17 0.51  1 
Panel c: Tranquil period (2000- end 2004) 

























Adjusted R2  0.005  0.008  0.010 
Number of Obs.  1305  1305  1305 
Residual Correlation Matrix: LR Test 250.05*** 
   CZ HU PL 
CZ  1  0.94 0.95 
HU  0.94  1  0.93 
PL  0.95 0.93  1 
Note: *, ** and *** denote rejection at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
LR Test attempts to reject the null hypothesis that all pair-wise correlations are 0. 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parenthesis. 
National Bank Index set as dependant variable.  
 
 
  31Table XII: Regression Results with International Dummies 
Panel-a : Total sample (1994- end 2004) 










































































































2 0.018 0.018 0.015 
Number of Obs.  2729 2729 2729 

















































































UK Bad news  -0.15  0.05  -0.44 
  32   (2.1297)**  (0.3730)  (0.7888) 

















2 0.017 0.016 0.010 
Number of Obs.  1424  1424  1424 









































































































Adjusted R2  0.030  0.029  0.038 
Number of Obs.  1305  1305  1305 
Note: *, ** and *** denote rejection at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parenthesis. 









  33     Table XIII: Breakdown of Results 
Panel-a : Total sample (1994- end 2004) 
   CZ HU PL 





























































































Panel-b : Tranquil period (1994- end 1999) 









































































































































































  Note: *, ** and *** denote rejection at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 Absolute value of t-statistics in parenthesis. 






















  35  Table XIV: Regional Shocks 

















-Tietmeyer sees 'no need' to cut German 
interest rates. 
-Euro zone growth to be driven by domestic 
demand: Trichet. 
- Chief executive of British Aerospace 
PLC, welcomed moves towards a single 
European currency. 
- The Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
added reserves to the banking system 









- War on the world: the silence; millions to 





















-State will receive billions of Czech Crowns 
from dividends. 
-President Klaus signs three new economic 
laws today. 
-Hungary central bank cuts key interest. 
 - Forint strengthens on rate cut. 
-Top bank PKO BP sells more shares to first-
time individual investors 
in IPO.  














-Central bank governor protests planned 
changes to bank law. 
-Forint firms on interbank market. 
- Central Bank holds Polish interest rates 
steady. 
 
  36Table XV: Modeling Volatility 
  CZ HU  PL 




























































Note: *, ** and *** denote rejection at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parenthesis. 




  37Figure I: The Czech Banking Sector 














level growth(right hand scale)
Source: Datastream International
  
Figure II: The Hungarian Banking Sector 



















level growth(right hand scale)
Source: Datastream International
  
Figure III: The Polish Banking Sector 



















level growth(right hand scale)
Source: Datastream International
 
  38Institute for International Integration Studies
The Sutherland Centre, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland